

Indonesia's Policy in Delaying the Ratification of Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) 2006 – 2019

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ABSTRACT

Piracy and armed robbery are the real threat faced by each state, in particular, Indonesia as the maritime (archipelagic) state. For facing Piracy and Armed Robbery, countries in Asia create The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Unfortunately, Indonesia is not joining into that regional cooperation that makes this phenomenon is very interesting to investigate. This article aims to identify systemic factors, societal factors, governmental factors & idiosyncratic factors as factors of Indonesian foreign policy to postpone the ratification of ReCAAP regional cooperation. The findings of this article among others the existence of similar cooperation, the developing narrative in society, the interaction and political dynamics between the government and the HoR, and the rational choice of the president to determine Indonesia to postpone the ratification of ReCAAP regional cooperation. This article uses a qualitative research method with a case study approach. Data collection techniques in this article use literature study where is sourced from several kinds of literature. This article concludes that the four factors above that influenced Indonesian policy did not ratify the ReCAAP regional cooperation.

Keywords: Armed Robbery, Foreign Policy, Piracy, ReCAAP.

INTRODUCTION

Indonesian maritime security from piracy, illegal fishing, and armed robberies are issues that must be considered by the Indonesian government because they interfere with Indonesia's national interests. This is because Indonesia is a country with a water area larger than the land area. In fact, according to the Indonesian Navy's Hydrographic and Oceanographic Agency, Indonesia is a country that is located between 2 continents (Asia and Australia), 2 oceans (Indian and Pacific), 17,504 islands, and an area of 7.9 million km², consisting of 1, 8 million km² of land area and 6.1 million km² of water area (EEZ area and territorial area), so about 77% of Indonesia's territory is water territory (Dishodros TNI AL, 2004).

Indonesia's geographical condition is one of the absolute advantages to be managed for Indonesia's interests, especially for trading activities. At least, according to Pasoroan Herman Harianja (Chairman of the Indonesian Maritime Pilots Association/INAMPA) that the country's economic potential from the maritime sector is more than 1,300 trillion per year by looking at the potential of the area in the Malacca Strait and 3 *Arus Laut Kepulauan Indonesia* (ALKI) and noting that there are 200 ships, where crosses the strait every day with the breakdown of 15.2% of the world's oil vessels (Pencawan & Kristianto, 2017). Countries in East Asia (Japan, South Korea, China, and others) will always pass through the Malacca Strait or ALKI to trade with countries in the African or Middle East region. This condition is very crucial for

Indonesia in obtaining benefits so that its geographical conditions need to be utilized as well as possible.

If we observe the geographical conditions and the great economic potential for Indonesia, the geographical security of Indonesian waters is very important to fulfill its national interests. In line with this, Connie Rahakundini Bakrie also explains that one of the threats to the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia at the regional security level is piracy (Bakrie, 2007). In 2009, the International Maritime Organization/IMO (2009) received reports that there were 409 related reports about piracy & Armed Robbery at sea, which in the previous year (in 2008) there was an increase of 106 incidents or 24.6 percent (IMO, 2009). In line with IMO, James Kraska explained that there was also an increase recorded by the International Maritime Bureau/IMB, explaining that there were almost 3,000 attempts from pirate attacks during 2000-2009 (Kraska, 2011).

In response to this challenge, in 2006, countries in the Asian region collaborated to handle piracy and armed robbery called the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). An effort to eradicate this activity is considered important by observing that Asian countries' export-import trade activities are highly dependent on increasingly significant sea routes (ReCAAP, n.d.-a).

The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was the first regional intergovernmental cooperation to collaborate to promote increased resistance to piracy and armed robbery of ships in Asia (ReCAAP, n.d.-b). There were at least 16 countries that signed the text of this regional agreement. ReCAAP became the first treaty that specifically aimed at eradicating piracy and armed robbery. Until April 2017, 20 countries have joined the ReCAAP regional cooperation (ReCAAP, n.d.-b).

The role and activities of ReCAAP in the ReCAAP Agreement such as, firstly as an information-sharing center (ISC) to promote close cooperation between the parties in preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery of ships, secondly increasing the capacity of the parties to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery of ships, thirdly promoting cooperation with other regional and international organizations (government organizations and shipping associations) to share information and best practices to enhance their networks to handle the piracy and armed robbery collectively (ReCAAP, n.d.-b). After ReCAAP was officially formed, on December 4, 2006, Indonesia's policy firmly postponed the ratification of the ReCAAP regional cooperation because it was against the sovereignty principle of 3 coastal states that secured the Malacca Strait (Purwanto, 2006). Indonesia often participates in several seminars and discussions organized by ReCAAP. However, after all this time, the discourse for Indonesia to ratify the ReCAAP regional cooperation again emerged in 2016 from the statement of Commission I member of the House of Representative (HoR), Charles Honoris (Siregar, 2016). Until now, this discourse is still being rolled out by some parties.

Based on these data, several assumptions are underlying the author's thoughts that Indonesia should be included in ReCAAP membership, but Indonesia does not participate in ReCAAP membership. First, Indonesia is an archipelago country (Archipelagic State) where crime act (especially Piracy & Armed Robbery) in water areas must be a major concern. Second, strategic values (both economic and security)

should be used wisely for Indonesia's national interests. Therefore, the research question raised by the author in this article is, "why Indonesia did not participate in ReCAAP membership?"

LITERATURE REVIEW

Since 2000, which was the peak of piracy activity, ReCAAP has effectively and significantly managed to overcome the number of attacks in the Southeast Asia region (Aprilia, 2017; Hribernik, 2013). This can be seen from the problem-solving capacity, increased collaborative cooperation, changes in member behavior, and optimal technical achievements. The existence of ReCAAP can also be an ideal opportunity for European countries to increase their influence in Southeast Asia and gain a foothold as a security actor in the region (Hribernik, 2013).

Several articles discuss the reasons for Indonesia not actively participating or delaying joining ReCAAP regional cooperation. There are non-material factors (history, values, and norms) that cause Indonesia to participate in ReCAAP (Swastika, 2018). In addition, the values and norms brought by ReCAAP were not in line with Indonesia, so Indonesia decided to cooperate with the existing ones. For example, ReCAAP carries the values of transparency, openness and so on which are contrary to the non-intervention values espoused by Indonesia (Swastika, 2018).

Furthermore, ReCAAP regional cooperation has the potential to violate Indonesia's sovereignty with various factors of consideration. For example, Indonesia must permit ReCAAP member countries to use and pass through Indonesian waters for the benefit of ReCAAP (A. R. Putra, 2017). Indonesia, which is not part of ReCAAP, stands on the argument that there will be interference from other countries, especially having to report data to other ReCAAP member countries. Of course, this makes relations between countries complex, especially in the ASEAN region (Andyva & Burhanuddin, 2018).

Arifin & Damanik explained that there were 3 reasons for Indonesia not to participate in the ReCAAP collaboration. First, the condition of the Malacca Strait does not require new cooperation, because there are already MALSINDO and EiS who will coordinate sea patrols and air surveillance. Second, the representative of the Indonesian Foreign Minister reasoned on his experience, in which Indonesia had experienced a misinterpretation of data where there had been a piracy attack on the IMB list in Malaysian territory belonging to Indonesia since the IMB reporting center was in Malaysia. Third, the postponement of the ratification of the ReCAAP agreement related to issues of sovereignty following Japan's growing intention to internationalize the Malacca Strait (Arifin & Damanik, 2020).

The articles above explain several reasons for Indonesia's postpone ReCAAP regional cooperation from various perspectives. However, there has been no article addressing this issue through James Rosenau's concept of foreign policy.

RESEARCH METHOD

The research method in this article uses a qualitative research method with a case study approach. Neuman states that case study research intensively investigates one or a small group of cases, focusing on many details in each case and context

(Neuman, 2014). In this article, the author focuses on the case of Indonesian policies that postpone the ratification of the ReCAAP agreement, especially in 2006 – 2019.

In the first phase of this article, the authors collected some secondary literature related to Indonesia's policy towards ReCAAP from books, scientific journals, documents, and articles from related online media. The data obtained will be forward through processing, the data classification process until it continues into the triangulation process. Triangulation is one source of data collection techniques for compiling data from different factors using the same technique (Sugiyono, 2012). This process aims to ensure the validity and reliability of the data, which leads to in-depth analysis.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

To answer the reason why Indonesia has postponed the ratification of ReCAAP regional cooperation is foreign policy. By definition, foreign policy is a strategy that can be taken by governments in determining their actions in the international world (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2014). This article draws on James Rosenau's concept of foreign policy. James Rosenau explained in more detail also divided it into 4 major input factors that became influences, such as (Rosenau, 1976):

First, First, systemic factors are a factor from the external environment of a country, such as the structure of relations between developed countries, patterns of alliances formed between countries, and situational factors. On the other hand, international values and norms, opinions of other actors are also important to be notified (Setiawan & Yani, 2019). In this context, if a country already has cooperation in certain fields, it will be a consideration when that country undertakes similar cooperation with other parties.

Second, societal factors, which are a factor that come from the internal environment, including cultural and historical factors, economic development, and social structures also public opinion. For societal factor focuses more on the narratives that are built-in society (public opinion). Of course, this can be started from some statements from experts who understand the issue.

Third, governmental factors are a factor that describes politics and structures in government. In terms of governmental factors, the dynamics between the government and the HoR on an issue. When the two agree, it will be easy to achieve it, and vice versa when they agree, there will be political lobbies that must be carried out.

Fourth, idiosyncratic factors are an internal factor of a policymaker/political elite by looking at experience, education, personality, and other factors in the life of political elites. No less important when looking at the idiosyncratic factor of a president. It can be seen when his education, experience, personality, and even the rational choice of the president is also determined. Therefore, this article analyzes the reasons why Indonesia, as a unit of analysis, postponed the ratification of ReCAAP regional cooperation using the 4 factors described above as an analytical tool.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

This section of the article will be divided into 4 sub-discussions, of which the 4 sub-discussions are the 4 factors that determine foreign policy according to James Rosenau. **First**, systemic factor: similar cooperation. The existence of similar cooperation which has been ratified by Indonesia makes it overlap so that the cooperation is ineffective. **Second**, societal factor: community participation. The narratives that develop in society so that the government is careful in deciding to postpone or ratify ReCAAP regional cooperation are the determining factors for foreign policy. **Third**, governmental factor: participation of government and HoR. Describe the interactions or dynamics developed between the government and the HoR to postpone the ratification of the ReCAAP regional cooperation. **Fourth**, idiosyncratic factor: The Rational Choice of the President. Educational background, family, experience, and personal political tendencies will determine the policy to postpone the ratification of ReCAAP regional cooperation.

SYSTEMIC FACTOR: INDONESIA'S SIMILAR COOPERATION

The international/regional (external) environment is one of the important elements in a foreign policy process. Rosenau said this is a systemic source, in brief, is the external/international environmental condition. Webber and Smith also analyze that the international domain is a challenge or an advantage to produce a more profitable foreign policy (Webber & Smith, 2002).

If examined more deeply, the systemic factor explains that Indonesia has ratified similar cooperation related to securing the territorial waters of piracy and armed robbery which causes the cooperation to overlap and be ineffective. For example, the International Maritime Organization and International Maritime Bureau & Littoral State cooperation. It is in line with the statement of the Minister of Defense, Juwono Sudarsono, who stated that Indonesia could still share information with the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) in Kuala Lumpur and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in London if many agencies or parties participated, it would add complexity at the end, it needs to negotiate again so that it becomes ineffective and inefficient (Purwanto, 2006). This is one of the reasons Indonesia's foreign policy has not ratified the ReCAAP regional cooperation. This condition is similar to the opinion of James Fearon who argues that countries must be rational in seeking their goals and consider what other countries are doing (or will do) concern for their international environment (systemic/international environment) (Fearon, 1998). Therefore, one of the considerations in taking a foreign policy is the international constellation faced by a country.

As an effort to find the right answer, the existence and cooperation that carried out by Indonesia against IMO are already in advance. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) was established with its initial name as the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) in 1958. On its official website, there are several work programs in various fields, including maritime safety, marine environment, human elements, technical cooperation, maritime security, legal affairs, facilitation, conference, communication & outreach, member state audit scheme & implementation support (IMO, n.d.-a).

The maritime security field is one of the fields in which it regulates piracy and armed robbery against ships. That action started in 2002 when the incidence of piracy and armed robbery were increased. IMO is also doing cooperation with regional cooperation in related fields, namely ReCAAP. IMO also issued several resolutions as a guide in decreasing piracy and armed robbery, one of which is by establishing IMO's Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), which aims to highlight adequate self-protection as the most appropriate prevention for acts or attempted acts of piracy and armed robbery (IMO, n.d.-c). To provide effectiveness in eradicating piracy and armed robbery, IMO MSC issued investigative guidelines that listed in MSC.1/Circ.1404 and resolution A.1025 which regulate the existence of coastal state legislation, investigator training, investigative strategies, protection from crime, and so on (IMO, n.d.-b).

Not only IMO, but also Indonesia has cooperated with the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) for a long time. IMB, which is a special division of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), has the objective to act as a focal point in fighting all types of crimes and maritime malpractice. IMO resolution A 504 aims to urge the government, all interests, and organizations to cooperate and exchange information with each other and the IMB to maintain and develop coordinated action in combating maritime fraud (IMB, n.d.-b). Therefore, the organization that was founded in 1981 can be said to have the main task of IMB is to protect the integrity of international trade by looking for fraud and malpractice. One of the IMB's main areas of expertise is in suppressing piracy. Concerned with the development of this alarming phenomenon, this led to the creation of the IMB Piracy Reporting Center in 1992 (IMB, n.d.-b). This information center is based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. It organizes travel on world shipping lanes, reports pirate attacks to local law enforcement and issues alerts about piracy hotspots.

In 1992, the IMB Piracy Reporting Center (IMB PRC) in work 24 hours as the main contact for ships attacked by piracy and armed robberies which were collected and followed up on patrol boats, even providing a danger signal pattern for colleagues, besides, information received is also disseminated to IMO, government, IGOs and related law enforcement agencies, as well as the funding made by IMB, is in the form of donations which is a reflection of trust in the work of IMB (IMB, n.d.-a). As the result, the patrol cooperation between the IMB and the Indonesian marine police has shown positive results by maximizing data sources and providing the best protection to ships. The IMB report for the year (2017) lists several incidents in a row, at least 79 incidents in 2013, 29 incidents in 2014, 56 incidents in 2015, and 26 incidents in 2016.

Besides IMO and IMB, Indonesia also has cooperation, namely Littoral State (Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia). Indonesia still respects the sovereignty of the 3 coastal countries where Indonesia believes that the cooperation of the 3 coastal states is still capable and responsible for securing the territorial waters of the 3 countries, especially the Malacca Strait. As a statement from the Director-General of Defense Strategy of the Ministry of Defense, Maj. Gen. Dadi Susanto, who argued that, if the ISC (Information Sharing Center) ReCAAP was intended only to secure the Malacca Strait under Japanese control, it would also disrespect the sovereignty of the three coastal nations, especially if the patrols were already underway maximum, so there is no need for control from countries outside the 3 coastal countries (Priyambodo, 2006). Therefore, it is worried in which this ReCAAP regional cooperation will be more

dominated by the presence of Japan as an initiator or it can be called an extension of the Japanese power, even resulting in concerns that Indonesia will be dictated by Japan if Indonesia joins ReCAAP. Besides, efforts to cooperate in regional maritime security in Southeast Asia, especially the Strait of Malacca, should be initiated by Southeast Asian countries, not by other countries (A. R. Putra, 2017).

Starting from the ministerial-level meeting in October and November 1971, produced a joint statement explaining that the responsibility for the security of the Malacca Strait and its surroundings is the responsibility of the three coastal states. This also strengthened by the cooperation of the Indo-Sin Coordinated Patrol (ISCP), Indonesia-Malaysia Coordinated Patrol (IMCP), and the ratification of the Terms of Reference of The Malacca Straits Patrol Joint Coordinating Committee (TOR MSP JCC) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Malacca Strait security operations in 2006 in Batam. Several steps of patrol cooperation are carried out effectively and regularly, including, Malaysia-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol, Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrol, Indonesia-Thailand Coordinated Patrol, Indonesia-India Coordinated Patrol, Malindo Optima Coordinated Patrol, Joint Maritime Air Patrol Operation Eye in The Sky (EiS), and the Malacca Straits Patrol Intelligence Exchange Group (MSP-IEG) also build a cooperative mechanism between the littoral state and the user state for cooperative cooperation and participate in maintaining and improving navigation safety and the security of the Malacca Strait and its surroundings.

Several parties from overseas are still waiting for Indonesia's participation in the regional cooperation for ReCAAP. Sean Moon, the assistant secretary's senior adviser to the US Department of Homeland Security's border, immigration and trade policy office, said that if Indonesia joined ReCAAP and coordinated with this multilateral agreement and the IMB, it would have greater coordinated patrols and gained better assets, better awareness, better targeting capacity and that would drive the piracy rate down (Yosephine, 2016). However, with the presence of IMO, IMB, and littoral state cooperation as systemic factors that have existed before ReCAAP with the same focus, namely overcoming piracy and armed robbery, it is one of the considerations for the Indonesian government not to ratify ReCAAP itself.

Another reason, Bradford (2004) and Sato (2007) give attention to the importance of calculating aggregate costs and benefits in informing Indonesian non-cooperation in ReCAAP and They claim that Indonesia did not join ReCAAP because of the low benefits perceived and high costs of cooperation (Febrica, 2014). Indonesia does not cooperate on ReCAAP because the aggregate incentives to cooperate are low. This is similar to Rosenau's statement, which states that, for systemic variables, this includes non-human aspects of the external environment of society or actions that occur abroad that influence the choices made by officials (Rosenau, 2006). Geographical realities and external dynamics (such as similar maritime cooperation, such as IMB, IMO, littoral state, ASEAN Maritime Forum, and so on) are clear examples of systemic variables that can shape decisions and actions of Indonesian foreign policy officials not to ratify ReCAAP.

SOCIETAL FACTOR: COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

This section will explain the existence of narratives that have developed in the community to be careful about ratifying any cooperation, including delaying the ratification of the ReCAAP regional cooperation. It is feared that this will be detrimental to Indonesia's interests because of overlapping cooperation so that it becomes ineffective and inefficient.

This variable generally consists of the non-governmental aspects of a society that influence its external behavior, for example, the main value orientation of a society, the level of national unity is just a few of the societal variables that can contribute to a country's foreign policy and aspirations (Rosenau, 2006). Until then, all discussions that develop in society transform into bigger and bigger public opinion. The expectations of the public and academics as input for the Indonesian government about foreign policy have not ratified the ReCAAP collaboration.

Several suggestions or criticisms were voice so that Indonesia would not ratify any kind of cooperation, including ReCAAP. Mardjono Reksodiputro, Professor of the Law University of Indonesia, reminded the government to be careful in adopting international/regional cooperation or provision. He was also worried that the ratification not considered first, would harm the interests of the state (Razak, 2008). In line with Mardjono, another professor of law focusing on international law, Hikmahanto Juwana, said that, in declaring its participation in regional cooperation, international conventions, and so on for ratification, Indonesia must be careful but not too afraid and remain to open the dynamics of international law. He also added that there are at least four requirements that must be taken into consideration in carrying out ratification, first, whether the international instrument can be adopted by national law, second, it must be measured the government's commitment if the ratification is signing (especially regarding financial support), third, it must be measured whether the Indonesian law enforcement system has been running well or not, fourth, what is the next implementation (particularly regarding reporting and monitoring), without these four requirements, the ratification will be ineffective (Ali, 2014). This is what the Indonesian government hopes as an important source to create a foreign policy in terms of ratification of international agreements or cooperation, particularly ReCAAP and others.

Many existing factors were spreading into the public sphere to form public opinion rapidly. Many opinions that develop in society in looking at an issue cannot be separate from a thing that can be the source, especially history, experience, culture, and other factors. If you look at its history, Indonesia has often ratified international agreements or cooperation. Former Indonesian diplomat as well as international law expertise, Harry P. Haryono, stated that Indonesia has indeed ratified too many international conventions also he is aware that this habit has started since the era of President BJ Habibie (Ali, 2014). This has become consistent with the fact that every decision-making mind is a microcosm from the diversity that may occur in a society, he also adds that culture, history, geography, economy, political institutions, ideology, demography, and countless other factors forming societal context/sources where decision-makers operate (Hudson, 2005).

So that, the societal factor that develops in the community becomes another important source. It is also a reminder for the Indonesian government to issue a policy of postponing the ReCAAP regional cooperation with the consideration that the

government should be careful in the signing of international agreements/cooperation. Other than that, the government must examine the challenges and benefits for Indonesia's national interest and not harmful to Indonesia's national interests.

GOVERNMENTAL FACTOR: PARTICIPATION OF GOVERNMENT AND HoR

There will always be mechanisms (especially politics/government) which a policy is to publish (through a statement/legal product). In this context, the existence of political dynamics & political interactions through meetings to become a legal product between the executive and legislative in Indonesia is a step that must be a pass as one of the factors of foreign policy. This shows that not only are the international constellations the source but also domestic dynamics are an important source as well, as James Fearon argues that IR experts have been thinking about whether and how to integrate domestic and international (or systemic) analysis (Fearon, 1998).

Furthermore, in a meeting between Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono and Commission I HoR RI, it was discussed about regional cooperation with ReCAAP and Indonesia did not join. After the meeting, Juwono Sudarsono said that Indonesia had not insisted on taking part in this cooperation, because currently there were coordinated patrols between Indonesia and Malaysia (Detiknews, 2006). Furthermore, that Indonesia had previously joined IMO and IMB.

The existence of overlapping with the principle of the sovereignty of the three coastal states that secure the Malacca Strait has made Indonesia not yet join in ReCAAP regional cooperation. In line with Juwono Sudarsono, Director General of Defense Strategy of the Ministry of Defense (Dirjen Strahan Dephan), Maj. Gen. TNI Dadi Susanto added that if regional cooperation aims to secure Asian seas from piracy and armed robbery, why should an Information Sharing Center (ISC) be placed in Singapore, which is also fully sovereign to secure its territory in the Malacca Strait (Priyambodo, 2006). This is interesting because when ISC was in Singapore, all data related to Indonesian territorial waters would be used by Singapore for its benefit. Furthermore, ReCAAP does not have the ability or resources to ensure the accuracy of the reports received by ISC. This is due to ReCAAP only accepts reports from ships that are victims of piracy & armed robbery without checking the situation directly, thus leading to errors in information/data. On the other hand, indirectly, Singapore also gets benefits from the establishment of ISC in its territory for Singapore's national interest with direct access while Indonesia gives its "data sovereignty" to other parties.

On the other hand, there are internal Indonesian parties who want Indonesia to join ReCAAP. Member of the Indonesian House of Representatives Commission I, Charles Honoris, argues that Indonesia needs to ratify international conventions in handling armed piracy to create a joint commitment to prevent, deter, arrest and punish perpetrators of piracy crimes and establish a joint information center (L. M. Putra, 2016). However, this was not strong enough to become the basis for Indonesia to join ReCAAP. There are large costs incurred by Indonesia when joining ReCAAP, as stated by Bradford and Sato Indonesia did not join ReCAAP because of the low benefits and the high cost of cooperation. In addition, regarding information sharing, Minister Juwono Sudarsono assumed that referring to the exchange of information between the three coastal countries and eleven ReCAAP member countries, he considered that it would cause overlapping information due to the large number of parties involved.

IDIOSYNCRATIC FACTOR: RATIONAL CHOICE OF PRESIDENT

The president's educational background, family, experience, and political tendencies make the president determine his rational choice for the national interest. John Lovell adds that individual decision-makers conceptualize the foreign policy situation as influenced by many factors, including the surrounding culture, the role of policy-making actors, and in some time concentrated on the influence of personality in individual behavior (Lovell, 1970). In addition, Umar Suryadi Bakry states that foreign policy decision-makers are often influenced by personal experience, mental and physical health, and so on (Bakry, 2016).

Sourced from Lovell that the surrounding culture, especially family is one of idiosyncratic, so it is in line with the cultural background of President SBY who was educated in a disciplined manner by his father, a soldier. Even SBY thinks his father (Sekotjo) is his idol, his father is a soldier, so in his simple household, he thinks his father is a hero (Maeswara, 2009). SBY also has a strong personality, responsibility, and intellect he acquired during his military education. This is also similar to the statement of Jerrold Post, where the admiration of a leader at a role mentor takes a very large part and there is a tendency for similarities in the form of policies taken with his role mentor (Post, 2006). Biographical notes are a clearer and more complete separate source because what is written is a description of a person's life and more complex, there is more in-depth research in the biography. The firmness, wisdom, and good calculation of SBY that comes from his family, especially his father, has made SBY firmly take several foreign policies. It is felt that there have been several similar collaborations, huge costs, and several other considerations for not joining ReCAAP regional cooperation.

The next president is Joko Widodo. The conditions of Jokowi's family at that time forced Jokowi to be simple, diligent, hard-working, and firm, which is reflected in his personality until now. This was proved when Jokowi was firm with Malaysia regarding the Ambalat issue by maintaining sovereignty and not being compromised (Armenia, 2015). In this context, Jerrold M. Post says these are core attitudes, which are an explanation of the basic behavior of a leader in responding to political events into a political decision or policy, where the basic behavior can come from psychological conditions that are influenced by nature, habits and environmental conditions that have been formed since childhood, they can also be influenced by the inherited nature of the family tree, then influenced by patterns of upbringing and parental ambition for one's future (Post, 2006).

Especially in this context the policy not to ratify ReCAAP, even though there are some parties to persuade Indonesia to join ReCAAP regional cooperation. Its high nationalist spirit has made Indonesia does not ratify ReCAAP because other national interests are bigger with the assumption that if joining ReCAAP costs a lot, there is information that overlaps with other similar cooperations.

CONCLUSION

This article answers that there are several reasons for Indonesia's postpone to ratify in the regional cooperation of ReCAAP. The ratification of the IMO, IMB and littoral state cooperation has made Indonesia postpone the ratification of the RECAAP regional cooperation because it has the same goal. It is feared that there will be overlapping of information and it will become ineffective and inefficient, one of which is in terms of cost, which becomes a systemic factor. Some narratives in the community argue that the government has to postpone the ratification of ReCAAP regional cooperation because it makes this cooperation ineffective, inefficient, and sacrifices national interests to become a societal factor. However, the government also need not be afraid to ratify other collaborations.

In addition, the dynamics and political interactions that occur between the government and the HoR through meetings must be passed before ratifying the cooperation which results in delaying the ratification of the ReCAAP regional cooperation because there have been several similar collaborations. These political dynamics and interactions become governmental factors. Idiosyncratic factors, namely educational background, family, experiences, etc. President SBY and Jokowi instilled a high sense of nationalism since childhood. This convinced them to postpone the ratification of the ReCAAP regional cooperation seeing that the losses received outweighed the benefits for Indonesia.

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